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ABSTRACT: Using corpus linguistics techniques, this article discusses the EU’s comprehensive 
approach narrative in the context of counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa. It shows that 1) the 
comprehensive approach is systematically put forward by the EU in its counter-piracy discourse, 2) 
this approach is presented as the best (if not the unique) and normal way to deal with the problem, 
and 3) the EU claims the paternity of this approach and attributes successes to its own activities and 
approach. The article demonstrates that the EU uses the comprehensive approach narrative to 
showcase its positive and unique contribution as a global security actor and to normalise its power 
projection practice. This case study also contributes to demonstrate that the comprehensive 
approach tends to achieve discursive dominance at the EU level. By integrating interpretative 
framework from the field of International Relations (IR) with the empirical, data driven descriptions 
that corpus linguistics analysis provides this article makes an original contribution to European 
foreign policy studies and contributes to the methodological enrichment of the discipline. 
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Following the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union (EU)’s foreign and security policy has 
traditionally been conducted by two distinct, although interrelated, bureaucracies, i.e. the 
Commission and the Council; the former being the supranational component of the Union, 
supposed to act in the interest of the Union itself (understood as something more than the 
sum of its member states) and the latter being the inter-governmental component, 
supposed to reflect compromises between member states. The heterogeneity of the agency 
within the EU’s structure has translated into so-called ‘turf wars’1 as well as competing 
discourses2. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which 
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results from the merging of the Directorate General External Relations with the Council 
secretariat responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Treaty of Lisbon has somewhat blurred the 
distinction between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the EU’s 
foreign and security policy, and offered the EU the possibility to develop and apply a more 
consistent and comprehensive approach to security that goes beyond the NATO concept of 
civil-military cooperation3 and implies projecting economic, civilian, military and normative 
power beyond the EU’s external boundary. 
 Since at least 2003, when the EU launched its first military operations and released 
the European Security Strategy (Council, 2003), the practice of projecting security beyond 
the EU’s external boundary has impacted on the formulation of the Union’s foreign, security 
and defence policy discourse. Whereas the dominant discourse (that is to say one which has 
reached hegemony within a particular policy and/or institutional context and thus is 
accepted and reproduced by the majority of the stakeholders within one community) has 
mainly remained focused on the soft power and ‘benign’ intentions of the EU, recent studies 
have stressed the development of a discourse pushing for the EU to act more strategically4 
or, in other words, to unleashed what Larsen, back in 2004, termed its ‘full-instrumental 
power’5. In addition, a geopolitical language has been growingly employed in the media and 
by EU officials to refer to the Union’s foreign policy goals and activities6, although the EU’s 
geopolitical discourse has mainly remained ‘tacit’7. In fact, despite the development of an 
EU geopolitical vision, the EU’s global actorness dominant discourse has seemingly rather 
been framed around the less controversial concept of the comprehensive approach to 
security, which is ‘uncontested’8, represents some sort of a ‘trademark’ for EU officials9 and 
is constructed as ‘an end in itself’10, i.e. a way to both fulfil the EU’s foreign and security 
policy goals and to rationalize, or normalize, its foreign and security policy activities as well 
as the relevance of the EU’s foreign and security policy actorness. 
 Whereas, the centrality of the comprehensive approach in the EU’s foreign, security 
and defence policy discourse has been acknowledged in the literature11, no study has yet 
systematically demonstrated the discursive prevalence of the comprehensive approach and 
the way it shapes the EU’s foreign and security policy dominant discourse leaving limited 
                                                          
3 N. Pirozzi, ‘The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’, EU Crisis Management Papers Series 
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Contribution of Critical Geopolitics to Piracy Studies’, Global Policy 4, no.1 (2013): 81. 
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10 P.M. Norheim-Martinsen, ‘EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End’, Contemporary Security 
Policy 32, no. 3 (2011): 518. 
11 For example A. Biava, M. Drent & G.P. Herd, ‘Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An 
Analytical Framework’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 6 (2011): 1227-1248; Smith, see n. 9 above; 
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room of manoeuvre for other sub-discourses, such as the geopolitical one, to develop. It is 
actually widely accepted in the literature that the EU brands its foreign and security policy 
with the comprehensive approach label, but scholars have failed to provide rigorous textual 
evidence for this. In turn, this gap in the literature has prevented current debates from 
discussing the extent to which the comprehensive approach narrative normalizes the EU’s 
practice of power projection. 
 Using corpus linguistics techniques, this article analyses the narratives surrounding 
the EU’s counter-piracy activities at the Horn of Africa (where the Union has been active 
since 2008). It shows that 1) the comprehensive approach is systematically put forward by 
the EU in its counter-piracy discourse, 2) it is presented as the best and evident (if not the 
unique) way to deal with the problem, and 3) the EU claims the paternity of this approach 
and attributes successes to its own activities and approach. This case study illustrates the 
way the EU uses the comprehensive approach to showcase its positive and unique 
contribution as a global security actor and to rationalize its power projection practice. By so 
doing the article also discusses the extent to which the comprehensive approach has 
achieved discursive dominance. 
 We start by discussing the methodology, data and process; we then review the 
concept of comprehensive approach and how it has been operationalized since 2008 in the 
context of the EU’s counter-piracy activities at the Horn of Africa. We then analyse the EU’s 
comprehensive approach narrative in the context of counter-piracy and the way it frames 
the EU’s dominant discourse using corpus linguistics techniques. We conclude on the 
dominant status of the comprehensive approach within the EU’s foreign, security and 
defence policy discourse, and what it demonstrates in terms of the EU’s global actorness. 
 
Methodology, data, process and limitations 
 
The methodology adopted in this article combines traditional qualitative discourse analysis 
methods from the field of International Relations (IR) with quantitative methods and 
techniques offered by corpus linguistics. More specifically it integrates IR interpretative 
framework with the empirical, data driven descriptions that the analysis of corpora is able to 
provide. 
A corpus is a large-scale collection of machine-readable texts. Both the size and the 
format element are relevant, because the idea behind corpus-based analysis is that it could 
not be done manually. We process corpora using software tools, which extract quantitative 
information (e.g. frequency lists and statistics) from the corpus and, as Scott and Tribble put 
it, reduce ‘the rich chaos of language’ to its ‘boiled down extract’12. Corpus tools enable us 
to process billions of words, to count what is frequent and what is rare in our dataset, and 
to identify linguistics patterns that may otherwise not be visible. Corpus work has an 
explorative nature and findings are often ‘serendipitous’13. The data are approached 
without a pre-defined theory, and even though there might be expectations about what will 
be found in the corpus ‘box’, it is the patterns that emerge bottom-up from the data that 
direct the path and the focus of the analysis. Such a data-driven approach does not 
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necessarily equate to objective findings, as pattern recognition remains an inevitably 
interpretative activity, it does, however, mean that our research is replicable and 
accountable14. 
At the core of the research is the corpus, therefore corpus design and compilation 
are integral part of the research process and our ‘results are only as good as the corpus’15, 
which means that the corpus we collect must suit the research question. This work is based 
on a 6 million word corpus, constituted of two main sub-corpora, which henceforth will be 
referred to as the “States corpus” and the “Bodies corpus”. The States corpus collects 
documents from institutional websites of EU member states, containing either the word 
piracy or maritime security, and the Bodies corpus collects documents from EU institutions 
and agencies, mentioning the same search terms. Methodologically speaking, corpus 
analysis is intrinsically comparative, as Baker explains: ‘[a] key way that we make sense of 
things is by casting the in relationship to something else’16. After all, the identification of 
patterns is a comparative ability: we count things that are similar, or we notice things that 
are different. With respect to the matter under investigation here, the rationale for 
comparing within and between States and Bodies was the prevision of potentially 
interesting affinities and contrasts. For example: it was anticipated that EU level institutions 
would show a greater tendency to present responses to piracy in terms of a coordinated 
comprehensive approach than would happen at individual member states’ level (or at least 
of some states) due to the supranational dynamics taking place at the EU level as well as the 
need to justify its approach and global actorness. Some expectations were confirmed, 
others were not corroborated by the evidence in the corpus. 
The original dataset collected automatically using web-crawling software was much 
larger than the finalized corpus and comprised data from all the 27 member states and 
relevant EU institutions (Council and EEAS). The finalized corpus consists of approximately 
17% of what was downloaded; the downsizing is due to two reasons17. Firstly, it is the result 
of a careful process of data harmonisation, consisting, for example, in the removal of 
documents in languages other than English, of duplicated documents and in the clean-up of 
boilerplate information, that was part of the web-pages downloaded, but unrelated to the 
content. Secondly, it is affected by the need to identify sub-sets of data viable for 
comparison, that is to say sources (individual member states or EU institutions) that 
provided enough material to allow and justify quantitative analysis, which explains our 
account of seven member states only. Table 1 illustrates the composition of the finalized 
dataset. 
 In the States corpus, looking at data distribution, a correspondence was noticed 
between the naval strength and tradition of the state and its greater engagement in the 
issue of maritime security. The correlation is generally confirmed, with a few exceptions. 
Denmark, for example, is a case of overrepresentation in the data, with respect to its navy 
(probably due to the importance of commercial shipping for Denmark in general and to the 
Danish-based Maersk shipping mega-company in particular), while for Sweden there is no 
document in the corpus despite its involvement in counter-piracy; both Portugal and Spain 
have sizable navies, but there were no texts for Portugal and for Spain there were so few 
                                                          
14 On the principle of ‘total accountability’ see T. McEnery & A. Hardie, Corpus Linguistics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14-16. 
15 J. Sinclair, Corpus, Concordance, Collocation (Oxford, oxford University press, 1991), 13. 
16 P. Baker, Sociolinguistics and Corpus Linguistics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 125. 
17 The authors would like to thank Dr Sheryl Prentice for her work in collecting an initial version of the corpus. 
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that it had to be excluded from the analysis; Italy and Greece, both with sizeable navy and 
naval traditions, are also comparatively underrepresented in the corpus. It must be 
acknowledged that the scarcity or absence of data for some of the member states might be 
due to the lack of English translations of the websites and documents, rather than 
necessarily reflecting their lack of involvement in maritime security. This constitutes a 
limitation of corpus linguistics (except when there is a possibility to conduct a multilingual 
study). 
 
Table 1: Composition of the finalized data set 
 
 
Source Texts Words 
Bodies 
EEAS 289 1,591,972 
Council 27 153,896 
States 
UK 230 1,939,591 
Germany 61 923,392 
France 345 533,513 
Italy 15 316,232 
Denmark 15 152,340 
Greece 40 102,191 
Netherlands 91 59,633 
 
Total 797 5,772,760 
 
Along with the assumption that Bodies and States would produce an interesting 
comparison, we also expected to find different representations of piracy and maritime 
security across the individual member states. Because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
data, we began the analytic process at States’ level, first examining each State sub-corpus 
and obtaining a description of the dominant representations for each ‘box’ and then 
comparing the descriptions to identify similarities as well as differences. One of the 
downsides of direct comparison between datasets, in fact, is that it tends to emphasize 
difference, while overlooking similarities18, a problem that we can overcome by comparing 
analyses rather than analysing comparisons.  
We predominantly worked with collocation analysis, looking at words that frequently 
appear in the vicinity of the terms piracy and maritime security in each dataset. ‘Collocates’ 
are words that co-occur with the ‘node’ word within a given ‘span’ (in the present study we 
adopted a fairly standard span of ten; five words to the left and five to the right of the 
node). Patterns of co-occurrence can be based on different definitions19, in this case 
collocates were calculated setting a minimum threshold for frequency (five occurrences in 
at least five separate documents) and combining two statistical metrics: Log-likelihood for 
statistical significance, and Mutual Information for strength of the attraction, as proposed in 
Gabrielatos and Baker20 (2008). The concept of ‘consistent-collocates’ (or c-collocates) 
developed by Gabrielatos and Baker is also central to this analysis, as they are indicators of 
similarity. C-collocates are words that stably collocate with the node in multiple datasets 
                                                          
18 C. Taylor, ‘Searching for similarity using corpus-assisted discourse studies’, Corpora 8, no.1 (2013): 81-113. 
19 McEnery & Hard, see n. 14 above, 122-133. 
20 C. Gabrielatos & P. Baker, ‘Fleeing, Sneaking, Flooding: A Corpus Analysis of Discursive Constructions of 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press, 1996-2005’, Journal of English Linguistics 36, no. 1 (2008): 5-38. 
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and are to be viewed as indicating core elements of meaning, semantic associations and 
semantic prosodies. Comparing collocational profiles of piracy and maritime security across 
sub-corpora, we identified some c-collocates that are shared by all (or most) sub-corpora 
(for example: Somalia or terrorism for piracy) and define dominant ways to present the 
subject matter, and others that are unique to one member state or institution (for example 
the pronoun we, which systematically co-occurs with piracy only in the EEAS data) that are 
related to a specific context and sometimes signposts of alternative discourses. 
The idea of shared and unique characteristics is extended beyond the individual 
collocates and applied to broad semantic categories on the basis of the dominant context in 
which the words appeared. The classification was derived introspectively on the basis of 
close reading and disambiguation. Four macro-categories, present in all the sub-corpora, 
were identified: Problem, Solution, Causes, and Places. The predominant categories are by 
far Problem (piracy as a problem a threat, a risk, references to pirate attacks, incidents, acts 
and associated phenomena/activities, such as armed robbery, terrorism and so on) and 
Solution (actions and strategies to prevent and stop piracy: fight, counter, tackling, effort, 
measures, operation and so on). This is typical of a problem-solution framework: 
 
‘The problem-solution pattern is characteristically lexically signalled either by means 
of inscribed signals (eg. solution) or inscribed evaluations functioning as signals (eg. 
unfortunately) or by means of evoking signals (eg. had no money). One or more of 
these signals serves as trigger for the pattern, in that it makes the pattern visible to 
the reader’21. 
 
The problem-solution framework was a productive way to interpret the corpus evidence at 
a further level of analysis, since it fits well with the ‘comprehensive approach’ model. While 
we consistently find problem-solution collocates across all sub-corpora, it remains to be 
seen whether similar patterns of co-occurrence are matched by uniform discourses. The 
analysis of concordance lines (obtained by retrieving all the instances of co-occurrence) can 
reveal new sets of patterns and evaluations. By examining words in context we can see the 
ways in which ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ are organized textually and which elements are 
addressed or prioritized: the problem, the response, the evaluation of the result22. In the 
Bodies corpus, for example, the focus is on the response, or rather the planning/intention of 
the response to maritime piracy; a feature that does not appear in any of the States’ sub-
corpora. 
 This snapshot of the research process – from quantification, through collocation 
analysis, classification and concordance analysis within each source and then comparing 
across sub-corpora – shows two typical elements of corpus-based analysis: firstly the fact 
that the initial handling of the corpus (compilation, clean-up, quantifications) is part and 
parcel of the analysis; secondly the fact that the analysis typically moves from general to 
particular in ever closer loops ‘funnelling’23 down the data. The analysis is fully driven by the 
data, findings emerge bottom-up and already from the early number-crunching potential 
areas of interest for further exploration. The present article focuses on one particular issue, 
but the corpus was not collected to analyse specifically this, it was the comprehensive 
                                                          
21 M. Hoey, Textual interaction, An Introduction to Written Discourse Analysis (London: Routledge, 2001), 140. 
22 M. Hoey, On the Surface of Discourse (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983). 
23 A. Marchi, ‘”The moral in the story”: a diachronic investigation of lexicalised morality in the UK press’, 
Corpora 5, no. 2 (2010): 164. 
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approach that emerged as salient from the corpus itself. The exhaustive analysis of such a 
large dataset brings up a variety of research paths and of findings, we chose to report here 
on one of the main patterns that were identified and pursued because they touched an 
issue of interest in the field of European studies. The following two sections discuss the 
concept and practice of the EU’s comprehensive approach (interpretative context); we then 
proceed with a corpus analysis of the ‘comprehensive approach’ narrative in the context of 
counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa. 
 
The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security 
 
The EU has become a global actor that holds and implements a variety of economic, civilian, 
military and normative leverages to influence other actors and shape events on the world 
stage. The diversity of tools at the EU’s disposal, the EU’s comparative advantage in civilian 
power projection as well as a desire to play the ‘benign interventionist’ card24 led to the 
adoption of a so-called comprehensive approach to security by the Union25, based on three 
interrelated elements: a comprehensive conception of what threats are and what security 
is, a comprehensive philosophy of the remedies to apply in response to crises and security 
threats, and a cross-sectoral and all-inclusive range of tools and actors envisaged to deal 
with security threats (i.e. a problem-solution framework). According to the literature in IR, 
this approach has not only been applied by the EU on the field but has also become 
intimately linked to the Union’s foreign and security policy dominant discourse26 and to the 
Union’s strategic culture27, where the comprehensive approach to security holds a central 
position. 
 The comprehensive conception of security is based on an encompassing perception 
and definition of threats, ranging from civil wars and international crises to transnational 
criminality, energy insecurity, and environmental degradations. In other words, it is based 
on the endorsement of an expanded security agenda following the end of the Cold War. This 
translates into an encompassing conception of what security is, which goes beyond defence 
and national security, so as to include human security (e.g. development, poverty, human 
rights) and regional and global security, which implies the promotion of certain values 
(supposed to contribute to countries’ stability, such as good governance, the rule of law and 
human rights) and the acknowledgement of actors’ interdependence. 
 Adopting a comprehensive approach to security also means endorsing a 
comprehensive philosophy of the remedies to apply to ‘treat’ the issues/threats. It is based 
on an understanding that peace and development are fundamentally intertwined (security-
development nexus), acknowledging the need to create favourable conditions for 
sustainable peace and security (long-term strategy) and thus understanding that treating 
the symptoms of conflicts/issues is not enough; what needs to be treated are the long-term 
root causes. This requires paying attention to long-term and structural problems, such as 
poverty, inequalities, exploitation, oppression, corruption, bad governance, etc. Accordingly, 
military and civilian responses should be integrated; cooperation with partners and 
                                                          
24 Norheim-Martinsen, see n. 10 above, 527. 
25 Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach’, Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting ( Brussels, 12 May 2014), in  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf. 
26 For example Zwolski, see n. 8 above, 991-994. 
27 For example Biava, Drent & Herd, see n. 11. 
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multilateralism (i.e. engaging with allies, international organisations, local authorities and 
NGOs) is supposed to work better than operating in isolation. Such an approach is also 
supposed to bring more legitimacy to security operations and thus reforms are likely to be 
endorsed more efficiently. Pooling various competences (including from the civil society) is 
also likely to increase the effectiveness of the remedies. Thus, another key expression in the 
EU’s discourse is effective multilateralism (or simply multilateralism), which is often linked 
to the comprehensive approach narrative and presented as a key to legitimacy, since 
multilateralism is supposed to guarantee that Europeans’ projection activities are not a new 
form of colonialism28. 
 Finally, adopting a comprehensive approach to security means favouring the use of a 
comprehensive range of tools and actors to tackle the threats. This includes political 
missions (diplomacy), military missions (including peace-enforcement and peace-keeping), 
civilian missions (including  police operations, security-sector reform (SSR) operations, which 
contribute to enhancing local operational competences and tolerance through the spread of 
norms, the rule of law and good governance), humanitarian aid (in the short term) and 
development assistance (in the long-term). Whereas, diplomacy, military and police 
operations are conducted by member states and the EU, NGOs and the civil society are 
encouraged to participate in the other activities, for which they sometimes possess better 
competencies/capacities. For example, to promote human rights practices, states can 
impose conditionalities on development assistance or can provide training to local forces 
(SSR), but field monitoring and the day-to-day social work will be carried out more 
efficiently by local and global NGOs. 
 
The Comprehensive Approach in Practice: The EU at the Horn of Africa 
  
At the Horn of Africa, the EU’s comprehensive approach, supported by the 2011 Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa29 and coordinated by a Special Representative for the 
Horn of Africa, translates into a variety of activities on the field: development programmes, 
financial assistance and diplomatic activities aiming at promoting not only economic growth 
but also the rule of law, human rights, good governance and democratic institutions; a 
military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia); counter-piracy operation Atalanta 
(EUNAVFOR) which has been active since December 2008 with an average of five to ten 
frigates and support vessels (as well as two to three maritime patrol aircrafts) patrolling the 
safety corridor and other assigned areas or escorting World Food Programme and African 
Union ships; a maritime capacity building mission (EUCAP Nestor) aiming at developing 
regional maritime governance capabilities, notably coast-guard tasks; as well a range of 
projects and activities such as the regional capacity-building Maritime Security Programme 
(MASE) and the Critical Maritime Routes Programme. This demonstrates a mix of short and 
long-term objectives and activities as well as a mix of defence, security and economic 
initiatives. 
 Effective multilateralism is also at play at the Horn of Africa. The EU cooperates with 
the UN, the African Union, NATO (operation Ocean Shield), US-led operation Enduring 
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Freedom – Horn of Africa, as well as with individual regional states and external players such 
as China, Japan and India. The EU has also been involved in the creation of the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in 2009 to facilitate cooperation in the 
field of counter-piracy, and the EU launched the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa 
(MSCHOA) to provide assistance to various stakeholders (but especially shipping 
companies). Those public-private partnership initiatives fit perfectly well with the holistic 
philosophy behind the comprehensive approach to security. 
 In its 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, the EU has set up both long-
term and short-terms objectives: On the one hand the Union aims ‘to support the people of 
the region in achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable 
government’, which requires promoting good governance, the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy in the region, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution in Sudan and 
Somalia, promoting economic growth and reduce poverty. On the other hand, the EU want 
to ensure that ‘until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not threaten the 
security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, terrorism or irregular migration’30. 
Assessing the success of the comprehensive approach in dealing with piracy at the Horn of 
Africa leads to two divergent findings. At first sight, the number of attacks has drastically 
diminished since 2011 and attacks eventually almost ceased. However, it appears that the 
structure for pirates to operate is still in place; pirates have just ceased operations for the 
time being; they have not been eradicated31. Moreover, the decrease in the number of 
attacks can well be attributed to the success of patrols, repression and law enforcement 
only (since this has engendered a cost too high for pirates) and not to the improvement of 
the political and security environment on land, although this has been widely debated even 
after 2011 when attacks gradually stopped32. The symptoms have been treated, but the 
root causes, i.e. weak state and bad governance, are seemingly still there as well as the 
organized criminal structures supporting piratical operations. The well-established pirates’ 
business model implies that as soon as they stop being deterred attacks will certainly 
resume, since the decision is based on a rather simple risk-benefit analysis. This tends to 
qualify the actual positive impacts of the comprehensive approach. The EU’s narrative has 
nonetheless highly praised this approach and its supposed success as discussed below. 
 
The Comprehensive Approach Narrative: Showcasing the EU’s Positive and Unique 
Contribution 
 
Corpus data shows that the EU’s practice at the Horn of Africa in the context of counter-
piracy has indeed been backed by a narrative systematically putting forward the 
comprehensive approach. In both States’ and Bodies’ data we find evidence of the discourse 
emphasizing comprehensiveness when dealing with piracy and maritime security, especially 
regarding the Horn of Africa and operation Atalanta33. This is not lexicalized as a holistic 
                                                          
30 Council of the European Union, see n. 29 above, 3. 
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32 For example S. Percy & A. Shortland, ‘The Business of Piracy in Somalia’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 
(2013): 541-578; C. Bueger, ‘Learning from piracy: future challenges of maritime security governance’, Global 
Affairs 1, no.1 (2015): 33-42. 




approach (as proposed by Zwolski34), but explicitly as a comprehensive approach or a 
comprehensive strategy, as well as being implied in a broader discourse of cooperation, 
multilateralism and multitask approach. The three-pronged way of tackling the problem (in 
this case the threat of piracy), i.e. legal aspects, military action and economic assistance, 
appears as well. This echoes scholarly debates about the comprehensive approach being at 
the core of the EU’s strategic culture ‘based on an enlarged vision of security and on a 
comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to threats, implying 
the use of all sorts of instruments (military and civilian) in an integrated manner’ (Biava, 
Drent and Herd, 2011, p. 1244). 
Counter-piracy operation Atalanta is represented in positive terms (we find explicit 
praise of it in 33% of the concordance lines) and as an EU’s success. Atalanta appears in the 
list of collocates for most sub-corpora: it is a c-collocate in four out of five sources and it is 
mentioned throughout the data (see Table 2 below). The low occurrence in the Danish sub-
corpus is probably due to Denmark having ‘opted out’ of the CSDP, hence only one mention 
of operation Atalanta despite a strong emphasis on maritime security. 
 







Denmark 1 6.6 6.5 
France 72 20.8 134.9 
Germany 34 55.7 36.8 
Netherlands 49 53.8 821.6 
UK 10 4.3 5.1 
EEAS 103 35.6 64.6 
 
A recurring characteristic in the examples where a positive evaluation of operation Atalanta 
is expressed is the description of the comprehensive approach. In fact, it appears that the 
comprehensive approach is key to the EU’s counter-piracy activities at the Horn of Africa 
(comprehensive also collocates with piracy in the sub-corpus) and data shows that the 
comprehensive approach is used by the EU as an indicator of positive process or even 
positive achievement in itself. In other words, the simple fact that a comprehensive 
approach was put in practice is represented as a proof of success and used as a (key) 
performance indicator. This fits well with Norheim-Martinsen’s point that ‘acting 
comprehensively has become an end in itself for the EU’36. 
 The three elements of law & order, deterrence & military action, and development 
also appear to construct a discourse of counter-piracy consistent with the idea of the 
comprehensive approach, i.e. a response that is multi-layered and has a broad scope, that 
not only solves the piracy problem in the short-term (by restoring freedom of navigation at 
the Horn of Africa) but also tackles the root causes of piracy, notably economic 
development and governance. Data shows that the comprehensive approach collocates with 
                                                          
34 Zwolski, see n. 8 above. 
35 Pmw means ‘per million words’. It is a normalized word frequency which allows comparison of word 
frequencies across corpora of different sizes. 
36 Norheim-Martinsen, see n. 10 above, 518. 
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both the symptomatic treatment of the threat (e.g. deter and disrupt/interrupt/arrest/delay 
piracy) and the root causal treatment (e.g. addressing the root causes of piracy will be 
essential / tackling symptoms and root causes). 
 By extending the analysis to the actual mentions of comprehensive approach, we 
found 71 references to the comprehensive approach in the EEAS sub-corpus. We find similar 
results in the French and Danish sub-corpora (see Table 3 below). France and Denmark were 
also the sub-corpora where strategic planning and prevention and a focus on cooperation 
were most represented. In the French data the semantic field of law & order was also 
particularly rich. It is interesting to note that the absence of references in the Dutch data 
does not correlate with a lack of interest in cooperation. On the contrary in the Dutch 
corpus we find copious references to multilateralism. In fact the Dutch corpus is 
characterized by general pragmatism and the discourse surrounding piracy puts the 
emphasis on resources and results (particularly military ones) rather than strategies and 
method, which may explain the data. 
 




Comprehensive approach % of texts Pmw 
Denmark 6 40 39.3 
France 23 6.6 43.1 
Germany 19 31.1 20.5 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
UK 26 11.3 13.4 
EEAS 71 24.5 44.5 
 
In sum, the EU’s involvement in counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa is constructed as a 
success and the comprehensive approach is represented as being instrumental in explaining 
this success. There are two characteristics to the representation of the comprehensive 
approach in the EEAS: 1) the fact that it is needed, and 2) the fact that it is an EU idea and 
the EU has got it. To begin with, in nearly 50% of the examples the necessity of a 
comprehensive approach is expressed. For instance: 
 
<need for a more comprehensive approach 
<a comprehensive approach [is] required/needed 
<must take a comprehensive approach, calls for sustaining a comprehensive 
approach 
<requires/calls for a comprehensive approach 
<find a way to bring all the EU’s assets together in a comprehensive approach 
<adopt/create/put together a comprehensive approach 
<achieving a real and purposeful comprehensive approach 
<cannot succeed without a comprehensive approach 
 
This shows that the EU’s discourse aims to construct the comprehensive approach as a 
necessity. This, in turn, may well help the EU stressing that its approach is best adapted to 
deal with the threat of piracy at the Horn of Africa by promoting the idea that the 
comprehensive approach is the only way to deal with the short-term as well as long-term 
12 
 
root causes of piracy. Whether this is true or not is not the focus of this article; what 
matters is that the comprehensive approach is presented as necessary. This narrative allows 
representing the EU’s approach, methods and activities as beyond question and ‘naturally’ 
successful. 
The construction of the comprehensive approach as the only and natural method for 
tackling piracy at the Horn of Africa (as shown in our data) is also backed and strengthened 
by academic and think tank discourses. Indeed the great majority if not all the authors 
discussing the EU’s involvement at the Horn of Africa have expressed the necessity to both 
tackle the symptoms and root causes of piracy, notably on land37, which reinforces the case 
for the adoption of a comprehensive approach and thus justifies the EU’s choice and, to 
some extent, praises its activities. The EU’s involvement in counter-piracy at the Horn of 
Africa has thus contributed to the naturalization of the comprehensive approach. i.e. taking 
its relevance as granted. The naturalization of a concept is instrumental in the process 
leading to the establishment of a dominant discourse, in this case the comprehensive 
approach dominant discourse (as discussed in the next section). 
 In addition to constructing the comprehensive approach as the natural way to tackle 
the threat of piracy, in 45% of the examples the idea and the practice of a comprehensive 
approach is described as an EU achievement, or in other words is labelled ‘made in the EU’. 
For instance: 
 
<the EU's unique capacity to deliver a comprehensive approach 
<the EU’s unique comprehensive approach also makes us a highly effective 
partner 
<this shows the weight of the EU and its comprehensive approach 
 
Although the concept of a comprehensive approach was not new when the EU started to 
emphasize on it in the mid-2000s38 and had notably been employed to refer to NATO civil-
military operations since the early 1990s39, the EU tends to claim (at least tacitly) the 
paternity of the comprehensive approach and presents it as an EU ‘trademark’40 or in other 
words a proof of the added value of the EU as a global security actor. This is all the more 
important since the EU represents its security and defence policy as a contribution to a 
multilateral world order41.  
 As an advocate of multilateralism, the role of the EU within multilateral frameworks 
is positively stressed, which the comprehensive approach narrative helps achieving. Data 
shows that comprehensiveness is indeed related to the global scope of the problem of piracy 
and to the international scope of the solution: international, cooperation, common, global, 
together. 17 out of 24 co-occurrences of piracy and cooperation are about the need or the 
                                                          
37 As mentioned by Percy & Shortland, see n. 32, 541. 
38 S. Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy in Context: A Comprehensive Trend’, in The EU and the European 
Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, eds S. Biscop & J.J. Andersson (London: Routledge, 2008), 13. 
39 In 2004 Denmark was the first to advocate such an approach within NATO, which is interesting given that 
Denmark is also overrepresented in our corpus data (c.f. above). In other words, Denmark’s interest in 
maritime security at the Horn of Africa may well be correlated with its interest in the comprehensive 
approach. 
40 Smith, see n. 9, 148. 
41 Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 
December 2003), 9-10. 
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commitment to strengthen/expand/enhance international cooperation, specifically with 
respect to law & order solutions: 
 
<ASEM leaders […] should look at the state of international legal cooperation 
on piracy and the need for stronger domestic legislation 
<strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation for 
comprehensively combating piracy and promoting maritime security 
<the European Union and the United States commit to strengthening 
cooperation in counter-piracy based on international law including dealing 
with root causes 
 
In addition to international cooperation we find references to international partners, 
coalition, forum, community, efforts and responsibility. Other signals of the shared problem 
and the (need for a) shared effort to solve it are found in expressions such as: act together, 
fighting together, work together, the common challenge of fighting piracy, combating piracy 
is a common challenge, common interests - namely against piracy, and so on. Piracy itself 
and piracy as a challenge is described as global: global piracy (five), global challenges like … 
piracy (four): Global issues (fight against terrorism, piracy at sea, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, water security, water resources management and food security). It 
appears that the comprehensive approach narrative and the multiple references to 
cooperation and multilateralism mutually reinforce each other. 
 In sum, the comprehensive approach to combating piracy at the Horn of Africa is 
constructed as the unique, natural and effective method to tackle the threat. The EU is 
presented as the initiator of such an approach and as having some sort of a comparative 
advantage in it, while fostering multilateralism and cooperation. The EU’s achievements are 
presented as successful and the comprehensive approach is depicted as instrumental in 
explaining the EU’s success in tackling both the short-term issues (i.e. pirates operating at 
the Horn of Africa) and the longer-term root causes (such as poverty, bad governance and 
insecurity on land).  
 
Discussion: the Comprehensive Approach as the Dominant Discourse 
 
A dominant discourse is one which has reached hegemony within a particular policy and/or 
institutional context, i.e. it is accepted and reproduced by the majority of the stakeholders 
within one community (e.g. the EU); those originally producing the narrative as well as the 
target audience. Ideas, norms and concepts put forward by the dominant discourse tend to 
be considered as natural and evident by the majority, including practitioners and sometimes 
scholars. The dominant discourse sustains social norms and is enduring, i.e. sudden 
paradigm shifts and exogenous factors cannot radically alter it, at least not in the short 
term, all the more since the effect of the dominant discourse is to stabilize one particular 
(social) order resulting in a perpetual circle of representation-construction-normalisation. 
The dominant discourse is however not homogenous and usually is made up of competing 
sub-discourses. 
 In the field of European studies, scholars have widely debated the nature of the EU 
as a global actor and despite many disagreements about the origin, scope and role of the 
EU’s foreign, defence and security policy discourse and about the extent to which it 
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influences and constrains the EU’s politics and policies42, a broad consensus has emerged 
about the discursive dominance (or at least centrality) of the EU’s values (such as 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, human rights and market economy) and 
about the fact that the need to promote these values beyond the EU’s external boundary in 
order to ‘secure Europe’ while contributing to ‘a better world’43 has become the accepted 
norm within the EU. In this context, scholars have stressed the existence of various 
competing sub-discourses, especially since the inception of the European Security and 
Defence Policy in 1999 and its operationalization in 2003. 
 Larsen suggested that since the end of the 1990s the ‘civilian power’ discourse has 
been challenged by a ‘full instrumental power’ discourse according to which ‘the Union's 
access to military means might be beneficial in responding to international crises and in 
contributing to international peace and stability’44. Building on that, Rogers identified an ‘EU 
Grand Strategy’ discourse, which constructs the EU as a global power: ‘the grand strategy of 
the Union was once organized around [...] its “civilian culture”, but [...] this has been 
restructured [...] to assume a “global role”, which requires the exercise of “full instrumental 
power”, mixing ideological, civilian and military components’45. That the EU must act more 
strategically has been defended and instigated by what Rogers calls a community of ‘euro-
strategists’46 and has indeed been put forward by the highest European bodies. For 
example, in 2008, the Implementation Report on the European Security Strategy stated that 
it is in the EU’s interest to be more visible and effective on the world stage by developing its 
strategic thinking: ‘To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we 
must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and 
more effective and visible around the world’47. However, this narrative is still questioned by 
other civil society stakeholders such as NGOs as well as some parts of the Commission in the 
field of development assistance where the ‘apolitical character of the EU’s aid’ remains an 
important feature48. 
  The normative power discourse, which emphasizes the superiority of the European 
values and the need to ‘change’ others49 may well prevent the EU from unleashing its ‘full-
instrumental power’ in practice, since it ‘sets the limits of legitimate foreign policy’ for the 
EU50. The EU is constructed as a model to follow, but to transform ‘others’ the method 
counts; the EU’s identity revolves around soft power norms hence the constraints placed on 
power and forces projection. In other words, even if in practice the EU does not follow the 
civilian or normative power discourse principles to the letter when its economic or 
geopolitical interests are at stake, in official documents and speeches, the dominant 
narrative remains articulated around the EU’s values, civilian intensions and normative 
                                                          
42 T. Diez, ‘Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy’, Cooperation and Conflict 49, no. 3 (2014): 319-
333; Larsen, see n. 5 above. 
43 Council of the European Union, see n. 41 above. 
44 Larsen, see n. 5 above, 72. 
45 J. Rogers, ‘”From Civilian Power” to “Global Power”: Explicating the European Union’s “Grand Strategy” 
Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory’, Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 4 (2009): 839. 
46 Ibid., 831. 
47 Council of the European Union, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing 
Security in a Changing World’ (Brussels, 2008), 2. 
48 Zwolski, see n. 8 above, 991. 
49 T. Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering “Normative Power Europe”’, Millennium, 
Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 613-636. 
50 Diez, see n. 42 above, 330. 
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power, which grants the Union with ‘civilizing’ credentials. Interestingly, Zielonka shows that 
the normative power discourse is linked to the ‘civilizing mission’ of the EU; it has 
‘legitimized the EU’s territorial expansion, transfer of laws and resources and even the 
sharing of sovereignty’51, although ‘this noble, normative self-image is not always 
recognized by the EU’s competitors and partners’52. In other words, the EU is engaged in a 
permanent quest to legitimize its external actorness and its external activities; a quest in 
which the discursive practice plays a central role. 
 The comprehensive approach is one of the competing sub-discourses. Its originality 
lies in its capacity to encompass and integrate elements from the other main sub-
discourses, i.e. civilian, normative and full-instrumental power discourses. The 
comprehensive approach discourse allows rationalizing the EU’s projection activities beyond 
its external boundary (be they responding to normative intensions or rather to ‘realpolitik’ 
interests) since the comprehensive approach encompasses civilian, normative, economic, 
humanitarian and, if needed, military elements. As mentioned earlier, the comprehensive 
approach plays the ‘benign interventionist’ card53. Its narrative conveys a message that is 
targeted at a broader audience and is ultimately more rallying. 
Our data has shown that, at least in the context of counter-piracy, this 
comprehensive approach narrative allows the EU to present itself and its approach as 
instrumental and almost natural and evident in explaining the positive successes achieved; 
positive success being often constructed as applying the comprehensive approach, finding 
indicators of success beyond proofs that a comprehensive strategy has been applied might 
not always been necessary. Discursive dominance is achieved thanks to the rallying 




Combining corpus linguistics techniques with traditional qualitative approaches this article 
has demonstrated that the comprehensive approach to security advocated by the European 
Union has systematically been represented as the most efficient, evident and natural option 
to tackle the threat of piracy at the Horn of Africa. This naturalization implies that the EU is 
represented as successful by the simple fact that it applies such an approach. Consequently, 
the EU’s projection activities are rationalized and normalized via the use of the 
comprehensive approach narrative. This illustrates the EU’s ongoing journey from being a 
‘soft power’ (mainly civilian) actor to being a ‘smart power’ actor, which is in a position to 
combine some elements of ‘full-instrumental power’ with a ‘comprehensive approach’ 
narrative that is true to its values and eventually more rallying. This puts the EU in a 
valuable position when it comes to the future of its foreign-policy actorness. 
 We have shown that, in the context of counter-piracy at the Horn of Africa, the 
comprehensive approach has achieved discursive dominance. This case study contributes to 
the debate about the centrality of the comprehensive approach within the EU’s foreign, 
defence and security policy discourse, which our findings quantitatively demonstrates with 
the aim to contribute to the existing qualitative literature on the question as well as to 
expose the relevance of corpus approaches to international relations. 
                                                          
51 J. Zielonka, ‘Europe's new civilizing missions: the EU's normative power discourse’, Journal of Political 
Ideologies 18, no. 1 (2013): 49. 
52 Ibid., 35. 
53 Norheim-Martinsen, see n. 10 above, 527. 
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The comprehensive approach narrative is central to the EU’s foreign, security and 
defence policy since it transcends the somewhat artificial barriers between the civilian, 
normative and full-instrumental power discourse. The EU is represented as having the 
solution to current security problems (such as piracy) in the form of the comprehensive 
approach. The EU’s model is thus the legitimate one to follow (normative power, 
transformative power); civilian as well as military instruments are constructed as 
complementary when it comes to transforming the ‘other’. This encompassing dimension of 
the comprehensive approach certainly explains its discursive dominance since it has the 
most rallying power of all the competing sub-discourses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
